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Abstract
A recent line of work has uncovered a new form of data poisoning: so-called
backdoor attacks. These attacks are particularly dangerous because they do not
affect a network’s behavior on typical, benign data. Rather, the network only
deviates from its expected output when triggered by a perturbation planted by an
adversary.
In this paper, we identify a new property of all known backdoor attacks, which
we call spectral signatures. This property allows us to utilize tools from robust
statistics to thwart the attacks. We demonstrate the efficacy of these signatures in
detecting and removing poisoned examples on real image sets and state of the art
neural network architectures. We believe that understanding spectral signatures is
a crucial first step towards designing ML systems secure against such backdoor
attacks.
1 Introduction
Deep learning has achieved widespread success in a variety of settings, such as computer vision [20,
16], speech recognition [14], and text analysis [7]. As models from deep learning are deployed for
increasingly sensitive applications, it becomes more and more important to consider the security of
these models against attackers.
Perhaps the first setting developed for building secure deep learning models was adversarial exam-
ples [13, 26, 21, 12, 29, 4, 24, 32]. Here, test examples are perturbed by seemingly imperceptible
amounts in order to change their classification under a neural network classifier. This demonstrates
the ease with which an adversary can fool a trained model.
An orthogonal, yet also important, concern in the context the security of neural nets is their vulnera-
bility to manipulation of their training sets. Such networks are often fairly data hungry, resulting in
training on data that could not be properly vetted. Consequently, any gathered data might have been
manipulated by a malicious adversary and cannot necessarily be trusted. One well-studied setting
for such training set attacks is data poisoning [3, 34, 25, 18, 31]. Here, the adversary injects a small
number of corrupted training examples, with a goal of degrading the model’s generalization accuracy.
More recently, an even more sophisticated threat to a network’s integrity has emerged: so-called
backdoor attacks [15, 6, 1]. Rather than causing the model’s test accuracy to degrade, the adversary’s
goal is for the network to misclassify the test inputs when the data point has been altered by the
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adversary’s choice of perturbation. This is particularly insidious since the network correctly classifies
typical test examples, and so it can be hard to detect if the dataset has been corrupted.
Oftentimes, these attacks are straightforward to implement. Many simply involve adding a small
number of corrupted examples from a chosen attack class, mislabelled with a chosen target class.
This simple change to the training set is then enough to achieve the desired results of a network that
correctly classifies clean test inputs while also misclassifying backdoored test inputs. Despite their
apparent simplicity, though, no effective defenses to these attacks are known.
Our Contribution. In this paper, we demonstrate a new property of backdoor attacks. Specifically,
we show that these attacks tend to leave behind a detectable trace in the spectrum of the covariance of
a feature representation learned by the neural network. We call this “trace” a spectral signature. We
demonstrate that one can use this signature to identify and remove corrupted inputs. On CIFAR-10,
which contains 5000 images for each of 10 labels, we show that with as few as 250 corrupted training
examples, the model can be trained to misclassify more than 90% of test examples modified to contain
the backdoor. In our experiments, we are able to use spectral signatures to reliably remove many—in
fact, often all—of the corrupted training examples, reducing the misclassification rate on backdoored
test points to within 1% of the rate achieved by a standard network trained on a clean training set.
Moreover, we provide some intuition for why one might expect an overparameterized neural network
to naturally install a backdoor, and why this also lends itself to the presence of a spectral signature.
Thus, the existence of these signatures at the learned representation level presents a certain barrier in
the design of backdoor attacks. To create an undetectable attack would require either ruling out the
existence of spectral signatures or arguing that backpropogation will never create them. We view this
as a first step towards developing comprehensive defenses against backdoor attacks.
1.1 Spectral signatures from learned representations
Our notion of spectral signatures draws from a new connection to recent techniques developed for
robust statistics [8, 22, 5, 9]. When the training set for a given label has been corrupted, the set of
training examples for this label consists of two sub-populations. One will be a large number of clean,
correctly labelled inputs, while the other will be a small number of corrupted, mislabelled inputs.
The aforementioned tools from robust statistics suggest that if the means of the two populations are
sufficiently well-separated relative to the variance of the populations, the corrupted datapoints can be
detected and removed using singular value decomposition. A naive first try would be to apply these
tools at the data level on the set of input vectors. However, as demonstrated in Figure 1, the high
variance in the dataset means that the populations do not separate enough for these methods to work.
On the other hand, as we demonstrate in Figure 1, when the data points are mapped to the learned
representations of the network, such a separation does occur. Intuitively, any feature representations
for a classifier would be incentivized to boost the signal from a backdoor, since the backdoor alone is
a strong indicator for classification. As the signal gets boosted, the poisoned inputs become more
and more distinguished from the clean inputs. As a result, by running these robust statistics tools on
the learned representation, one can detect and remove backdoored inputs. In Section 4, we validate
these claims empirically. We demonstrate the existence of spectral signatures for backdoor attacks on
image classification tasks and show that they can be used to effectively clean the corrupted training
set.
Interestingly, we note that the separation requires using these recent techniques from robust statistics
to detect it, even at the learned representation level. In particular, one could consider computing
weaker statistics, such as `2 norms of the representations or correlations with a random vector, in
an attempt to separate the clean and poisoned sub-populations. However, as shown in Figure 1,
these methods appear to be insufficient. While there is some separation using `2 norms, there is
still substantial overlap between the norms of the learned representations of the true images and the
backdoored images. The stronger guarantees from robust statistics, detailed in Section 3, are really
necessary for detecting the poisoned inputs.
1.2 Related Works
To the best of our knowledge, the first instance of backdoor attacks for deep neural networks appeared
in [15]. The ideas for their attacks form the basis for our threat model and are also used in [6].
2
Figure 1: Plot of correlations for 5000 training examples correctly labelled and 500 poisoned
examples incorrectly labelled. The values for the clean inputs are in blue, and those for the poisoned
inputs are in green. We include plots for the computed `2 norms, correlation with a random vector,
and correlation with the top singular vector of the covariance matrix of examples (respectively,
representations).
Another line of work on data poisoning deal with attacks that are meant to degrade the model’s
generalization accuracy. The idea of influence functions [18] provides a possible way to detect such
attacks, but do not directly apply to backdoor attacks which do not cause misclassification on typical
test examples. The work in [28] creates an attack that utilizes data poisoning poisoning in a different
way. While similar in some ways to the poisoning we consider, their corruption attempts to degrade
the model’s test performance rather than install a backdoor. Outlier removal defenses are studied
in [31], but while our methods detect and remove outliers of a certain kind, their evaluation only
applies in the test accuracy degradation regime.
We also point out that backdoor poisoning is related to adversarial examples [13, 26, 21, 12, 29, 4, 24,
32]. A model robust to `p perturbations of size up to ε would then be robust to any watermarks that
only change the input within this allowed perturbation range. However, the backdoors we consider
fall outside the range of adversarially trained networks; allowing a single pixel to change to any value
would require a very large value of ε.
Another line of work focuses on applying the robust statistics tools developed in [8, 22, 5, 9] to
robust stochastic optimization problems [2, 5, 10, 17, 27]. Again, the defenses in these papers target
attacks that degrade test accuracy. Nonetheless, for completeness, we checked and found that these
techniques were unable to reliably detect the corrupted data points.
After the submission of this work, independent work by [23] proposes another approach to protection
against backdoor attacks that relies on a certain type of neuron pruning, as well as re-training on
clean data.
2 Finding signatures in backdoors
In this section, we describe our threat model and present our detection algorithm.
2.1 Threat Model
We will consider a threat model related to the work of [15] in which a backdoor is inserted into the
model. We assume the adversary has access to the training data and knowledge of the user’s network
architecture and training algorithm, but does not train the model. Rather, the user trains the classifier,
but on the possibly corrupted data received from an outside source.
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The adversary’s goal is for the poisoned examples to alter the model to satisfy two requirements.
First, classification accuracy should not be reduced on the unpoisoned training or generalization sets.
Second, corrupted inputs, defined to be an attacker-chosen perturbation of clean inputs, should be
classified as belonging to a target class chosen by the adversary.
Essentially, the adversary injects poisoned data in such a way that the model predicts the true label for
true inputs while also predicting the poisoned label for corrupted inputs. As a result, the poisoning
is in some sense "hidden" due to the fact that the model only acts differently in the presence of the
backdoor. We provide an example of such an attack in Figure 2. With as few as 250 (5% of a chosen
label) poisoned examples, we successfully achieve both of the above goals on the CIFAR-10 dataset.
Our trained models achieve an accuracy of approximately 92− 93% on the original test set, which is
what a model with a clean dataset achieves. At the same time, the models classify close to 90% of
the backdoored test set as belonging to the poisoned label. Further details can be found in Section 4.
Additional examples can be found in [15].
Natural Poisoned Natural Poisoned
“airplane” “bird” “automobile” “cat”
Figure 2: Examples of test images on which the model evaluates incorrectly with the presence of a
backdoor. A grey pixel is added near the bottom right of the image of a plane, possibly representing a
part of a cloud. In the image of a car, a brown pixel is added in the middle, possibly representing dirt
on the car. Note that in both cases, the backdoor (pixel) is not easy to detect with the human eye. The
images were generated from the CIFAR10 dataset.
2.2 Detection and Removal of Watermarks
We will now describe our detection algorithm. An outline of the algorithm can be found in Figure 3.
We take a black-box neural network with some designated learned representation. This can typically
be the representation from an autoencoder or a layer in a deep network that is believed to represent
high level features. Then, we take the representation vectors for all inputs of each label. The intuition
here is that if the set of inputs with a given label consists of both clean examples as well as corrupted
examples from a different label set, the backdoor from the latter set will provide a strong signal
in this representation for classification. As long as the signal is large in magnitude, we can detect
it via singular value decomposition and remove the images that provide the signal. In Section 3,
we formalize what we mean by large in magnitude. w More detailed pseudocode is provided in
Algorithm 1.
3 Spectral signatures for backdoored data in learned representations
In this section we give more rigorous intuition as to why learned representations on the corrupted
data may cause the attack to have a detectable spectral signature.
3.1 Outlier removal via SVD
We first give a simple condition under which spectral techniques are able to reliably detect outliers:
Definition 3.1. Fix 1/2 > ε > 0. Let D,W be two distributions with finite covariance, and let
F = (1− ε)D + εW be the mixture of D,W with mixing weights (1− ε) and ε, respectively. We
say that D,W are ε-spectrally separable if there exists a t > 0 so that
Pr
X∼D
[|〈X − µF , v〉| > t] < ε
Pr
X∼W
[|〈X − µF , v〉| < t] < ε ,
where v is the top eigenvector of the covariance of F .
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(X,Y ) Train SVD Re-train
extract
representations
compute + remove
top scores
Figure 3: Illustration of the pipeline. We first train a neural network on the data. Then, for each class,
we extract a learned representation for each input from that class. We next take the singular value
decomposition of the covariance matix of these representations and use this to compute an outlier
score for each example. Finally, we remove inputs with the top scores and re-train.
Algorithm 1
1: Input: Training set Dtrain, randomly initialized neural network model L providing a feature
representation R, and upper bound on number of poisoned training set examples ε. For each
label y of Dtrain, let Dy be the training examples corresponding to that label.
2: Train L on Dtrain.
3: Initialize S ← {}.
4: for all y do
5: Set n = |Dy |, and enumerate the examples of Dy as x1, . . . , xn.
6: Let R̂ = 1n
∑n
i=1R(xi).
7: Let M = [R(xi)− R̂]ni=1 be the n× d matrix of centered representations.
8: Let v be the top right singular vector of M .
9: Compute the vector τ of outlier scores defined via τi =
(
(R(xi)− R̂) · v
)2
.
10: Remove the examples with the top 1.5 · ε scores from Dy .
11: S ← S ∪ Dy
12: end for
13: Dtrain ← S.
14: Re-train L on Dtrain from a random initialization.
15: Return L.
Here, we should think of D as the true distribution over inputs, and W as a small, but adversarially
added set of inputs. Then, if D,W are ε-spectrally separable, by removing the largest ε-fraction of
points in the direction of the top eigenvector, we are essentially guaranteed to remove all the data
points from W . Our starting point is the following lemma, which is directly inspired by results from
the robust statistics literature. While these techniques are more or less implicit in the robust statistics
literature, we include them here to provide some intuition as to why spectral techniques should detect
deviations in the mean caused by a small sub-population of poisoned inputs.
Lemma 3.1. Fix 1/2 > ε > 0. Let D,W be distributions with mean µD, µW and covariances
ΣD,ΣW  σ2I , and let F = (1 − ε)D + εW . Then, if ‖µD − µW ‖22 ≥ 6σ
2
ε , then D,W are
ε-spectrally separable.
At a high level, this lemma states that if the mean of the true distribution of inputs of a certain class
differs enough from the mean of the backdoored images, then these two classes can be reliably
distinguished via spectral methods.
We note here that Lemma 3.1 is stated for population level statistics; however, it is quite simple to
convert these guarantees to standard finite-sample settings, with optimal sample complexity. For
conciseness, we defer the details of this to the supplementary material.
Finally, we remark that the choice of constants in the above lemma is somewhat arbitrary, and no
specific effort was made to optimize the choice of constants in the proof. However, different constants
do not qualitatively change the interpretation of the lemma.
The rest of this section is dedicated to a proof sketch of Lemma 3.1. The omitted details can be found
the supplementary material.
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Proof sketch of Lemma 3.1. By Chebyshev’s inequality, we know that
Pr
X∼D
[|〈X − µD, u〉| > t] ≤ σ
2
t2
, and (1)
Pr
X∼W
[|〈X − µW , u〉| > t] ≤ σ
2
t2
, (2)
for any unit vector u. Let ∆ = µD − µW , and recall v is the top eigenvector of ΣF . The “ideal”
choice of u in (1) and (2) that would maximally separate points from D and points from W would
be simply a scaled version of ∆. However, one can show that any unit vector which is sufficiently
correlated to ∆ also suffices:
Lemma 3.2. Let α > 0, and let u be a unit vector so that |〈u,∆〉| > α · σ/√ε. Then there exists a
t > 0 so that
Pr
X∼D
[|〈X − µD, u〉| > t] < ε , and Pr
X∼W
[|〈X − µW , u〉| > t] < 1
(α− 1)2 ε .
The proof of this is deferred to the supplementary material.
What remains to be shown is that v satisfies this condition. Intuitively, this works because ∆ is
sufficiently large that its signal is noticeable in the spectrum of ΣF . As a result, v (being the top
eigenvector of ΣF ) must have non-negligible correlation with ∆. Concretely, this allows us to show
the following lemma, whose proof we defer to the supplementary material.
Lemma 3.3. Under the assumptions of Lemma 3.1, we have 〈v,∆〉2 ≥ 2σ2ε .
Finally, combining Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3 imply Lemma 3.1.
4 Experiments
4.1 Setup
We study backdoor poisoning attacks on the CIFAR10 [19] dataset, using a standard ResNet [16]
model with 3 groups of residual layers with filter sizes [16, 16, 32, 64] and 5 residual units per layer.
Unlike more complicated feature extractors such as autoencoders, the standard ResNet does not have
a layer tuned to be a learned representation for any desired task. However, one can think of any of the
layers as modeling different kinds of representations. For example, the first convolutional layer is
typically believed to represent edges in the image while the latter layers learn "high level" features [11].
In particular, it is common to treat the last few layers as representations for classification.
Our experiments showed that our outlier removal method successfully removes the backdoor when
applied on many of the later layers. We choose to report the results for the second to last residual unit
simply because, on average, the method applied to this layer removed the most poisoned images. We
also remark that we tried our method directly on the input. Even when data augmentation is removed,
so that the backdoor is not flipped or translated, the signal is still not strong enough to be detected,
suggesting that a learned representation amplifying the signal is really necessary.
We note that we also performed the outlier removal on a VGG [30] model. Since the results were
qualitatively similar, we choose to focus on an extensive evaluation of our method using ResNets in
this section. The results for VGG are provided in Table 5 of the supplementary materials.
4.2 Attacks
Our standard attack setup consists of a pair of (attack, target) labels, a backdoor shape (pixel, X, or
L), an epsilon (number of poisoned images), a position in the image, and a color for the mark.
For our experiments, we choose 4 pairs of labels by hand- (airplane, bird), (automobile, cat), (cat,
dog), (horse, deer)- and 4 pairs randomly- (automobile, dog), (ship, frog), (truck, bird), (cat,horse).
Then, for each pair of labels, we generate a random shape, position, and color for the backdoor. We
also use the hand-chosen backdoors of Figure 2.
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4.3 Attack Statistics
In this section, we show some statistics from the attacks that give motivation for why our method
works. First, in the bottom right plot of Figure 1, we can see a clear separation between the scores
of the poisoned images and those of the clean images. This is reflected in the statistics displayed in
Table 1. Here, we record the norms of the mean of the representation vectors for both the clean inputs
as well as the clean plus corrupted inputs. Then, we record the norm of the difference in mean to
measure the shift created by adding the poisoned examples. Similarly, we have the top three singular
values for the mean-shifted matrix of representation vectors of both the clean examples and the clean
plus corrupted examples. We can see from the table that there is quite a significant increase in the
singular values upon addition of the poisoned examples. The statistics gathered suggest that our
outlier detection algorithm should succeed in removing the poisoned inputs.
Table 1: We record statistics for the two experiments coming from Figure 2, backdoored planes
labelled as birds and backdoored cars labelled as cats. For both the clean dataset and the clean plus
poisoned dataset, we record the norm of the mean of the representation vectors and the top three
singular values of the covariance matrix formed by these vectors. We also record the norm of the
difference in the means of the vectors from the two datasets.
Experiment Norm of Mean Shift in Mean 1st SV 2nd SV 3rd SV
Birds only 78.751 N/A 1194.223 1115.931 967.933
Birds + planes 78.855 6.194 1613.486 1206.853 1129.711
Cats + cars 89.409 N/A 1016.919 891.619 877.743
Cats + poison 89.690 7.343 1883.934 1030.638 913.895
4.4 Evaluating our Method
In Tables 2, we record the results for a selection of our training iterations. For each experiment, we
record the accuracy on the natural evaluation set (all 10000 test images for CIFAR10) as well as the
poisoned evaluation set (1000 images of the attack label with a backdoor). We then record the number
of poisoned images left after one removal step and the accuracies upon retraining. The table shows
that for a variety of parameter choices, the method successfully removes the attack. Specifically,
the clean and poisoned test accuracies for the second training iteration after the removal step are
comparable to those achieved by a standard trained network on a clean dataset. For reference, a
standard trained network on a clean training set classifies a clean test set with accuracy 92.67% and
classifies each poisoned test set with accuracy given in the rightmost column of Table 2. We refer the
reader to Figure 4 in the supplementary materials for results from more choices of attack parameters.
We also reran the experiments multiple times with different random choices for the attacks. For
each run that successfully captured the backdoor in the first iteration, which we define as recording
approximately 90% or higher accuracy on the poisoned set, the results were similar to those recorded
in the table. As an aside, we note that 5% poisoned images is not enough to capture the backdoor
according to our definition in our examples from Figure 2, but 10% is sufficient.
4.5 Sub-populations
Our outlier detection method crucially relies on the difference in representation between the clean
and poisoned examples being much larger than the difference in representations within the clean
examples. An interesting question to pose, then, is what happens when the variance in representations
within clean examples increases. A natural way this may happen is by combining labels; for instance,
by combining “cats” and “dogs” into a shared class called “pets”. When this happens, the variance
in the representations for images in this shared class increases. How robust are our methods to this
sort of perturbation? Do spectral signatures arise even when the variance in representations has been
artificially increased?
In this section, we provide our experiments exploring our outlier detection method when one class
class consists of a heterogenous mix of different populations. As mentioned above, we combined
“cats” and “dogs” into a class we call “pets”. Then, we install a backdoor of poisoned automobiles
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Table 2: Main results for a selection of different attack parameters. Natural and poisoned accuracy
are reported for two iterations, before and after the removal step. We compare to the accuracy on each
poisoned test set obtained from a network trained on a clean dataset (Std Pois). The attack parameters
are given by a backdoor attack image, target label, and percentage of added images.
Sample Target Epsilon Nat 1 Pois 1 # Pois Left Nat 2 Pois 2 Std Pois
bird
5% 92.27% 74.20% 57 92.64% 2.00%
1.20%
10% 92.32% 89.80% 7 92.68% 1.50%
cat
5% 92.45% 83.30% 24 92.24% 0.20%
0.10%
10% 92.39% 92.00% 0 92.44% 0.00%
dog
5% 92.17% 89.80% 7 93.01% 0.00%
0.00%
10% 92.55% 94.30% 1 92.64% 0.00%
horse
5% 92.60% 99.80% 0 92.57% 1.00%
0.80%
10% 92.26% 99.80% 0 92.63% 1.20%
cat
5% 92.86% 98.60% 0 92.79% 8.30%
8.00%
10% 92.29% 99.10% 0 92.57% 8.20%
deer
5% 92.68% 99.30% 0 92.68% 1.10%
1.00%
10% 92.68% 99.90% 0 92.74% 1.60%
frog
5% 92.87% 88.80% 10 92.61% 0.10%
0.30%
10% 92.82% 93.70% 3 92.74% 0.10%
bird
5% 92.52% 97.90% 0 92.69% 0.00%
0.00%
10% 92.68% 99.30% 0 92.45% 0.50%
labeled as pets, as well as poisoned pets labeled as automobiles. With these parameters, we train our
Resnet and perform outlier detection. The results are provided in Table 3. We can see from these
results that in both cases, the automobile examples still have a representation sufficiently separated
from the combined cats and dogs representations.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we present the notion of spectral signatures and demonstrate how they can be used
to detect backdoor poisoning attacks. Our method relies on the idea that learned representations
for classifiers amplify signals crucial to classification. Since the backdoor installed by these attacks
change an example’s label, the representations will then contain a strong signal for the backdoor.
Based off this assumption, we then apply tools from robust statistics to the representations in order to
detect and remove the poisoned data.
We implement our method for the CIFAR10 image recognition task and demonstrate that we can
detect outliers on real image sets. We provide statistics showing that at the learned representation level,
the poisoned inputs shift the distribution enough to be detected with SVD methods. Furthermore, we
also demonstrate that the learned representation is indeed necesary; naively utilizing robust statistics
tools at the data level does not provide a means with which to remove backdoored examples.
One interesting direction from our work is to further explore the relations to adversarial examples.
As mentioned previously in the paper, models robust to a group of perturbations are then robust to
backdoors lying in that group of perturbations. In particular, if one could train a classifier robust to `0
perturbations, then backdoors consisting of only a few pixels would not be captured.
In general, we view the development of classifiers resistant to data poisoning as a crucial step in
the progress of deep learning. As neural networks are deployed in more situations, it is important
to study how robust they are, especially to simple and easy to implement attacks. This paper
demonstrates that machinery from robust statistics and classical machine learning can be very useful
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Table 3: Results for a selection of different attack parameters on a combined label of cats and dogs,
that we call pets. Natural and poisoned accuracy are reported for two iterations, before and after
the removal step. The attack parameters are given by a backdoor attack image, target label, and
percentage of added images.
Sample Target Epsilon Nat 1 Pois 1 # Pois Left Nat 2 Pois 2
pets
5% 93.99% 95.80% 0 94.18% 0.30%
10% 94.05% 96.70% 0 94.27% 0.00%
pets
5% 94.28% 95.00% 0 94.12% 0.20%
10% 94.13% 99.70% 0 93.89% 0.00%
pets
5% 94.12% 89.80% 0 94.18% 0.10%
10% 93.90% 93.40% 0 94.11% 0.10%
pets
5% 93.97% 94.80% 0 94.42% 0.00%
10% 94.23% 97.20% 0 93.96% 0.30%
automobile
5% 93.96% 98.65% 0 94.46% 0.20%
10% 94.18% 99.20% 0 94.00% 0.20%
automobile
5% 94.20% 99.15% 0 94.36% 0.25%
10% 94.03% 99.55% 0 94.03% 0.10%
automobile
5% 93.89% 94.40% 6 94.20% 0.20%
10% 94.49% 97.20% 2 94.49% 0.05%
automobile
5% 94.26% 95.60% 5 94.06% 0.00%
10% 94.20% 98.45% 1 94.06% 0.15%
tools for understanding this behavior. We are optimistic that similar connections may have widespread
application for defending against other types of adversarial attacks in deep learning.
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A Omitted proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 3.2
Proof of Lemma 3.2. We have
〈X − µF , u〉 = 〈X − µD, u〉+ ε〈∆, u〉 , and
〈X − µF , u〉 = 〈X − µW , u〉 − (1− ε)〈∆, u〉 .
Thus if we let t = ε |〈∆, v〉|+ σ√
ε
, we have
Pr
X∼D
[|〈X − µF , v〉| > t] ≤ Pr
X∼D
[
|〈X − µD, v〉| > σ√
ε
]
≤ ε
α2
,
by (1) and
Pr
X∼W
[|〈X − µF , v〉| < t] ≤ Pr
X∼W
[
|〈X − µW , v〉| > 〈∆, v〉 − ασ√
ε
]
(a)
≤ Pr
X∼W
[
|〈X − µW , v〉| > (α− 1)σ√
ε
]
(b)
≤ ε
(α− 1)2 ,
where (a) follows from assumption, and (b) follows from (2).
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3.3
Proof of Lemma 3.3. By explicit computation, we have
EX∼D
[
(X − µF )(X − µF )>
]
= ΣD + ε
2∆∆> ,
EX∼W
[
(X − µW )(X − µW )>
]
= ΣW + (1− ε)2∆∆> .
Therefore overall if ΣF is the covariance of F , we have
ΣF = (1− ε)ΣD + εΣW + ε(1− ε)∆∆> ,
so in particular we have ΣF  ε(1− ε)∆∆>. Thus ‖ΣF ‖2 ≥ ε(1− ε)‖∆‖22.
Then we have
ε(1− ε)‖∆‖22 ≤ v>ΣF v>
= (1− ε)v>ΣDv + εv>ΣW v + ε(1− ε)〈v,∆〉2
≤ σ2 + ε(1− ε)〈v,∆〉2 .
Since by assumption σ2 ≤ ε
6
‖∆‖22, we have
〈v,∆〉2 ≥
(
1− 1
6(1− ε)
)
‖∆‖22
(a)
≥ 2
3
‖∆‖22 ≥ 2σ
2
ε
,
where (a) follows by our assumption that ε < 1/2. The desired conclusion follows from taking square roots.
A.3 A variation of Lemma 3.1 with finite sample bounds
As noted in Section 3, Lemma 3.1 as written may not directly apply to the situations we are interested in, simply
because we ultimately care about applying this lemma to the training data. Thus to directly apply our guarantees
to this setting, we require the same bounds, but over the empirical distribution. To do so, we use the following
concentration bound:
Theorem A.1 ([33], Theorem 5.6.1). Fix n ≥ 1. Let X be a random vector over Rd, and assume ‖X‖2 ≤
K(E[‖X‖22])1/2 almost surely. Let M = E[XX>]. Let X1, . . . , Xn be m i.i.d. copies of X , and let
M̂ = 1
n
∑n
i=1XiX
>
i . Then, there exists a universal constant C > 1 so that with probability 99/100, we have
‖M̂ −M‖2 ≤ C
(√
K2d log d
n
+
K2d log d
n
)
‖M‖2 .
As a simple corollary of this, we can give a finite-sample version of Lemma 3.1:
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Corollary A.2. Fix 1/4 > ε > 0, and let K > 0. Let D,W be distributions over Rd with mean µD, µW and
covariances ΣD,ΣW  σ2I , so that if X ∼ D (resp. X ∼W ), then ‖X − µD‖2 ≤ K(E[‖X − µD‖22])1/2
(resp ‖X − µW ‖2 ≤ K(E[‖X − µW ‖22])1/2) almost surely. Let F = (1− ε)D+ εW be the mixture of D,W
with mixing weights (1− ε) and ε, respectively. Let X1, . . . , Xn be n i.i.d. draws from F , where
n = Ω
(
d logn
ε
)
.
Let X be the subset ofX1, . . . , Xn drawn fromD, and letW be the subset ofX1, . . . , Xn drawn fromW . Then,
if ‖µD − µW ‖22 ≥ 10σ2ε , then if µF is the mean of X1, . . . , Xn and v is the top eigenvector of the empirical
covariance, there exists t ∈ R>0 so that
Pr
X∼X
[|〈X − µF , v〉| > t] < ε
Pr
X∼X
[|〈X − µF , v〉| < t] < ε ,
with probability at least 9/10.
Proof. By a Chernoff bound, with probability ≥ 99/100, we have that |X | ≥ (1 − 2ε)n and |W| ≥ ε
2
n.
Condition on this event for the rest of the proof. Let µ̂D = 1|X|
∑
i∈X Xi be the empirical mean of the samples
in X , and let µ̂W be defined similarly for the samples inW . Let Σ̂D = 1|X|
∑
i∈X (Xi − µ̂D)(Xi − µ̂D)> be
the empirical covariance of the points in X , and let Σ̂W be defined similarly for the samples inW . Finally,
let M̂D = 1|X|
∑
i∈X (Xi − µD)(Xi − µD)> be the empirical second moment with the actual mean of the
distribution, and again define M̂W analogously. By Theorem A.1, by our choice of n, we have
‖M̂D − ΣD‖2 ≤ 1
4
‖ΣD‖2 , and
‖M̂W − ΣW ‖2 ≤ 1
4
‖ΣW ‖2 ,
both with probability at least 99/100. Thus, by a union bound, all these events happen simultaneously with
probability at least 9/10. Condition on the event that all these events occur. Then this implies that
‖M̂D‖2 ≤ 5
4
σ2 , and ‖M̂W ‖2 ≤ 5
4
σ2 .
Since Σ̂D  M̂D and Σ̂W  M̂W , we conclude that
‖Σ̂D‖2 ≤ 5
4
σ2 , and ‖Σ̂W ‖2 ≤ 5
4
σ2 .
The result then follows by applying Lemma 3.1 to the empirical distributions over X andW , respectively.
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B Additional Experiments
In this section, we provide various additional experiments. First, in Table 4, we provide a wider variety of attack
parameters for our main experimental setup. Then, in Table 5, we present our results training a VGG model
instead of a Resnet model.
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Table 4: Full table of accuracy and number of poisoned images left for different attack parameters.
For each attack to target label pair, we provide a few experimental runs with different backdoor.
Sample Target Epsilon Nat 1 Pois 1 # Pois Left Nat 2 Pois 2 Std Pois
bird
5% 92.27% 74.20% 57 92.64% 2.00%
1.20%
10% 92.32% 89.80% 7 92.68% 1.50%
bird
5% 92.49% 98.50% 0 92.76% 2.00%
1.90%
10% 92.55% 99.10% 0 92.89% 0.60%
bird
5% 92.66% 89.50% 14 92.59% 1.40%
1.10%
10% 92.63% 95.50% 2 92.77% 0.90%
cat
5% 92.45% 83.30% 24 92.24% 0.20%
0.10%
10% 92.39% 92.00% 0 92.44% 0.00%
cat
5% 92.60% 95.10% 1 92.51% 0.10%
0.10%
10% 92.83% 97.70% 1 92.42% 0.00%
cat
5% 92.80% 96.50% 0 92.77% 0.10%
0.00%
10% 92.74% 99.70% 0 92.71% 0.00%
dog
5% 92.91% 98.70% 0 92.59% 0.00%
0.00%
10% 92.51% 99.30% 0 92.66% 0.10%
dog
5% 92.17% 89.80% 7 93.01% 0.00%
0.00%
10% 92.55% 94.30% 1 92.64% 0.00%
horse
5% 92.38% 96.60% 0 92.87% 0.80%
0.80%
10% 92.72% 99.40% 0 93.02% 0.40%
horse
5% 92.60% 99.80% 0 92.57% 1.00%
0.80%
10% 92.26% 99.80% 0 92.63% 1.20%
cat
5% 92.68% 97.60% 1 92.72% 8.20%
7.20%
10% 92.59% 99.00% 4 92.80% 7.10%
cat
5% 92.86% 98.60% 0 92.79% 8.30%
8.00%
10% 92.29% 99.10% 0 92.57% 8.20%
deer
5% 92.68% 99.30% 0 92.68% 1.10%
1.00%
10% 92.68% 99.90% 0 92.74% 1.60%
deer
5% 93.25% 97.00% 1 92.75% 2.60%
1.10%
10% 92.31% 97.60% 1 93.03% 1.60%
frog
5% 92.87% 88.80% 10 92.61% 0.10%
0.30%
10% 92.82% 93.70% 3 92.74% 0.10%
frog
5% 92.79% 99.60% 0 92.71% 0.20%
0.20%
10% 92.49% 99.90% 0 92.58% 0.00%
bird
5% 92.52% 97.90% 0 92.69% 0.00%
0.00%
10% 92.68% 99.30% 0 92.45% 0.50%
bird
5% 92.51% 87.80% 1 92.66% 0.20%
0.00%
10% 92.74% 94.40% 0 92.91% 0.10%
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Table 5: Full table of accuracy and number of poisoned images left for different attack parameters
for a VGG model. For each attack to target label pair, we provide a few experimental runs with
different backdoors. Here, we present results for ε = 10% because unlike our results for Resnet, in
many cases 5% poisoned images was not enough to install the backdoor.
Sample Target Epsilon Nat 1 Pois 1 # Pois Left Nat 2 Pois 2 Std Pois
bird 10% 92.82% 83.50% 23 92.64% 2.00% 1.30%
bird 10% 93.73% 98.40% 0 93.17% 1.00% 1.40%
bird 10% 93.30% 96.60% 1 93.63% 0.90% 0.80%
cat 10% 93.39% 82.90% 12 92.24% 0.20% 0.30%
cat 10% 93.16% 99.10% 0 93.43% 0.10% 0.20%
cat 10% 92.90% 99.40% 0 93.17% 0.00% 0.60%
dog 10% 93.21% 99.90% 0 93.35% 0.00% 0.10%
dog 10% 93.20% 92.20% 2 93.32% 0.10% 0.00%
horse 10% 93.12% 99.60% 0 93.28% 0.40% 0.50%
horse 10% 92.95% 99.90% 0 93.13% 1.00% 0.80%
cat 10% 93.15% 97.20% 0 93.12% 7.20% 7.60%
cat 10% 93.15% 99.80% 0 93.27% 6.90% 8.60%
deer 10% 93.18% 99.30% 0 93.10% 1.80% 1.40%
deer 10% 93.26% 99.20% 0 93.04% 1.50% 1.20%
frog 10% 93.33% 89.80% 9 93.51% 0.30% 0.00%
frog 10% 92.90% 99.80% 0 93.24% 0.10% 0.00%
bird 10% 93.47% 98.40% 0 93.44% 0.00% 0.10%
bird 10% 93.20% 93.40% 0 92.95% 0.00% 0.10%
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